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Lest the citizenry lose faith in the substance of the system and the
procedures we use to administer it, we can ill afford to confront them with
a government dominated by forms and mysterious rituals and then tell
them they lose because they did not know how to play the game or should
not have taken us at our word. 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing questions facing the judiciary today is:
Whether and to what extent judges must or may afford self-represented
litigants (SRLs)2 information, assistance, or accommodations in the
litigation process, consistent with their right to due process of law, and
the judicial duty to ensure a fair and impartial trial? Undoubtedly, the
state court opinion passage quoted above describes an undesirable and
avoidable situation. The Supreme Court, however, has given mixed
messages to lower courts regarding this question. It has indicated, on the
one hand, that SRLs must follow the same rules and procedures as
represented parties, that SRLs are not entitled to instruction from the trial
judge regarding courtroom procedures and on matters that would
ordinarily be attended to by counsel, and that judges may not act as
attorneys or paralegals for SRLs. On the other hand, some of the Court's
opinions reflect a sensitivity to the inequality between SRLs and lawyers
and recognize the disadvantages they face in litigation. The Court has,
however, occasionally recognized a need for judges to provide notice of
certain procedural traps that unwary SRLs may face. A failure to provide
such notice of procedural traps may deny SRLs their day in court, but the
Supreme Court has never set forth a general duty on the part of trial
judges to assist SRLs.
In an effort to assist the judiciary in navigating the seemingly
mixed messages coming from the Supreme Court, this paper reviews
federal Circuit Court of Appeals case law which discusses required,
permissible, and impermissible forms of judicial assistance to SRLs. Part
I presents Supreme Court rulings on the right to self-representation,
noting that the right has been expressly applied in the criminal context,
but only impliedly for civil litigants. Part II describes the Court's early
rulings in which judges were advised that pro se criminal defendants lack
* Professor, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Loyola University Chicago; Ph.D.,
Arizona State University (1990); J.D., DePaul College of Law (1975); B.S., University of Illinois
(1972).
i Teegarden v. Dir., Ark. Emp't Sec. Div., 591 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Ark. Ct. App.) (Newbum,
J., dissenting).
2 I use the acronym SRL to refer collectively to both pro se civil litigants and criminal
defendants.
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a constitutional right to personal instruction from trial judges about
courtroom procedures. Yet, these same pro se defendants are obligated to
comply with the same judicial rules about which they receive no
instruction as represented parties. Part II notes that the Supreme Court
recently recognized there is an asymmetry of representation in cases
involving SRLs with lawyer adversaries, and that due process requires
some substitute procedural safeguards to address this asymmetry.
Part III presents the results of a review of over 300 federal circuit
court opinions involving various forms of judicial assistance to include
providing information to, and making accommodations for SRLs. The
decisions are categorized by the nature of assistance provided (or
refused), and whether each was found to be required, permissible, or
impermissible. Lastly, Part IV discusses the role of judicial ethics, and
the modification to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct bearing
upon this issue.
The Article concludes that the evolution of federal appellate
courts' position on assistance to SRLs, as slow as it has been, is a
welcome change. It is the Supreme Court which must now catch up to
lower federal courts and modify its strict no-assistance policy, consistent
with due process and the judicial duty to ensure SRLs a fair trial.
PART I SOURCE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. Self-Representation i Criminal Cases
The constitutional right of self-representation in the U.S. was
established for criminal cases in Faretta v. California,3 in which a
defendant appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court denied
him the right to represent himself. Justice Stewart wrote, in the majority's
5-4 decision, that the issue was "whether a State may constitutionally hale
a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even
when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. It is not an easy
question, but we have concluded that a State may not constitutionally do
so."
4
Defendant Faretta once represented himself, with only a high
school education, because he was afraid the public defender's heavy case
load would hinder his defense. 5 After first accepting the Defendant's
waiver of counsel, the trial judge held another hearing questioning him
about his knowledge of the hearsay rule, and state jury-selection law
3 3See Faretta v. California,422 U.S. 806 (1975).
4 Id. at 807.
5 Id.
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governing. The judge then reversed himself, holding that Faretta had no
constitutional right to self-representation.6 Faretta was not allowed to
participate in his own defense, and was ubsequently found guilty and
sentenced to prison for grand theft.
7
The Court supported its decision that the Sixth Amendment,
guaranteeing the right to the "assistance of counsel," implied a right to
self-representation in part by a review of the common law. Historically,
counsel was not permitted to appear for defendants in felony cases before
the 17th century; it was not until passage of the Treason Act in 1695 that
lawyers could present a defense for a defendant charged with treason.8 It
was not until 1836 that the ban on counsel for the defense in felony cases
was eliminated.9
In the colonies, anti-lawyer sentiment persisted based on colonists'
experience with representatives of the Crown and the King's Justice
Courts, which were bent on conviction of those who opposed to the
King's prerogatives.1 0 Over time, colonial judges began to relax the
prohibition of counsel, and eventually, after the Revolution, many
colonial charters and declarations of rights included the right to counsel.
Eventually, a right to self-representation was established with the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 11
B. Self-Representation i Civil Cases
The Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a right to self-
representation in civil cases. However, the Court's jurisprudence reveals
that the right to self-representation, while not expressly referred to, is
impliedly protected under several constitutional bases. First, the Court in
Corfield v. Coryell held that the privileges and immunities clause of
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 112 includes the "privileges and immunities
which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union,
from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign." 3 One
6 Id. at 809.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 824-25.
9 Id. at 825.
io Id. at 826-27.
ii Id. at 831. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2018).
12 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States."
13 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
2019] FORMS OF FED. JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 221
of these rights is "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the
courts of the state."
14
The Court in Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. held that the
First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances includes "[tihe right to sue and defend in the courts." 15 It is
"the alternative of force," a "right conservative of all other rights," "the
foundation of an orderly government," "one of the highest and most
essential privileges of citizenship," a "right not to be denied by states
against those of other states," and thus is "protected by the federal
Constitution." 
16
More recently, a series of Supreme Court decisions held that the
Due Process Clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment includes
a right of access to courts. The right of access to courts is traced to two
lines of cases: one involving prisoners' rights and another establishing
the rights of non-prisoner litigants. Regarding prisoners' rights, Johnson
v. Avery struck down prison regulation prohibiting inmates from
assisting each other to prepare habeas corpus petitions and other legal
action. 17 Wolff v. McDonnell extended Johnson to prisoners' civil rights
complaints.18 Ross v. Moffitt held that "meaningful access" to courts
requires states to "assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity
to present his claims fairly. 19 Additionally, in Smith v. Bounds the Court
held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
require[s] prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing
of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law," such as
paralegals or law students.20
For non-prisoners, the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, struck
down a statute requiring payment of filing fees for divorce petitions that
made no accommodation for indigent parties unable to pay such fees. The
statute was held to violate due process, and thus denied indigent parties'
14 Id. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Court rejected the
fundamental-rights approach, holding that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, referred to in the 14
t
h Amendment, § 1 (as distinguished from those of citizens of the several
States referred to in Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1) are those the Court has in its decisions recognized. This
includes the right "to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices,
[and] to engage in administering its functions," citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 35, 39
(1868).
15 Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
16 Id.
17 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
is Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-580 (1974).
19 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
2o Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
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right of access to courts.21 Tennessee v. Lane then recognized the
fundamental right of access to the courts which is "protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."22 The Court in Lane
noted that "ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot
justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of
access to the courts."23
This summary review of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
clearly establishes the right to self-representation in criminal cases. A
similar right can be implied from additional rulings by the Court
establishing a right to sue or defend in courts, the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances, and the right of access to courts.
None of the aforementioned rulings recognizing these rights is limited to
litigants who are represented. The question, therefore, becomes: If the
right to self-representation in criminal and civil cases is of a constitutional
dimension, to what extent do courts have an obligation to ensure that
SRLs can meaningfully exercise the right by some form of judicial
assistance?
PART II SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
In Faretta, the Court noted that "[i]t is undeniable that in most
criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's
guidance than by their own unskilled efforts . . . [but] it is not
inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact
present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense."24 The
latter statement was followed by footnote 46, which indicated that the
trial judge could appoint over the objection of the accused standby
counsel "to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to
be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the
defendant's self-representation is necessary."25 So, appointment of
21 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
22 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
23 Id. at 533 (emphasis added). Judges may complain of the general concept of judicial
assistance to SRLs based on the inconvenience of having to instruct SRLs on courtroom procedure
and other matters. But this comment in Lane supports the view that inconvenience to the court alone
is not a justification for judges' refusal to assist SRLs in exercising their constitutional right to
personally assert their claims and defenses.
24 Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). "The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State,
will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free
personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he
may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of
'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."' Quoting Ill. v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
25 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, n. 46.
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standby counsel is one form of discretionary, permissible judicial
assistance authorized by the Court.
The Supreme Court next addressed the question of the extent to
which SRLs are entitled to assistance in McKaskle v. Wiggins,26 a case
involving a pro se criminal defendant for whom two standby counsel
were appointed for his state robbery trial. Defendant Wiggins complained
that the extent of standby counsels' involvement during his trial had
"unfairly interfered with the presentation of his defense."27 Wiggens
argued that "his Faretta right to present his defense pro se was impaired
by the distracting, intrusive, and unsolicited participation of counsel
throughout the trial." 28 The Court noted that "[t]he pro se defendant must
be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to
make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to
question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate
points in the trial.' 29 The Court found Wiggins had in fact been afforded
those rights, and denied his appeal.30
In the course of its decision regarding the extent of Wiggins'
standby counsels' participation, the Court stated that the right to self-
representation is not infringed, "when standby counsel assists the pro se
defendant in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to
the completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or
objecting to testimony, that the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to
complete. Nor are they infringed when counsel merely helps to ensure the
defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and
procedure."31 Two sentences later the Court made the following point,
which has been relied upon by many judges as a justification for not
providing assistance to SRLs:
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal
instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does the
Constitution require judges to take over chores for a pro se defendant that
would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of course.
Faretta recognized as much. 'The right of self-representation is not a
license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to
comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law', 3
2
Wiggins therefore holds that the trial judge may assist a pro se
defendant by appointing standby counsel to help the pro se defendant
26 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
27 Id. at 173.
28 Id. at 176.
29 Id. at 174.
30 Id. at 175.
31 Id. at 183.
32 Id. at 183-84 (quoting Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)).
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with "overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the
completion of some specific task" and complying with "basic rules of
courtroom protocol and procedure,"33 but simultaneously advises judges
that they themselves need not provide similar assistance. The obvious but
unstated concern of the Court is that judges will lose their impartiality by
providing the assistance only standby counsel could provide. But, if no
standby counsel is provided, and judges follow the no-right-to-personal-
instruction-on-courtroom-procedure rule, how will SRLs be able to
meaningfully invoke their constitutional rights to self-representation and
access to courts?
So, the Court, on the one hand, requires SRLs to comply with the
same rules of procedure and evidence as represented parties. But, on the
other hand, it declares that they have no right to be informed of what those
rules are. Despite denying them a right to be informed of court
procedures, the Court in subsequent opinions held that judges should
provide SRLs with certain forms of assistance or accommodation.
The Supreme Court as early as 1866 recognized the challenges
facing SRLs not skilled in the law. In Purcell v. Miner, a property dispute
between two SRLs who each claimed title to certain property, the Court
noted that,
[a] good deal of testimony was taken, [with] many of the
interrogatories the parties managing their own case being of a most
leading character. The case appears to have been carried on by the
parties propriA personA, who are excusable for their ignorance of all
the rules of pleading and practice in a court of chancery, or the proper
mode of taking testimony. 34
Modernly, the Court, in reversing an order dismissing a prisoner
SRL's civil rights complaint, admonished lower courts in Haines v.
Kerner that civil SRLs' pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," are to
be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers," because they are "entitled to an opportunity to offer proof."35
In Title VII cases, the Court held that "a technical reading [of Title VII]
would be 'particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which
laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process."36
The Court also held that affirmative notice and warnings to habeas
petitioners are required of trial judges who consider recharacterizing a
prisoner's motion as his or her first habeas petition:
33 Id. at 183.
34 71 U.S. 513 (1866).
35 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (emphasis added). Pro se "pleadings" has now been expanded to
"documents" generally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
36 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 397 (1982) (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404
U.S. 522, 527 (1972)).
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[T] he court cannot so recharacterize a pro se litigant's motion as the
litigant's first § 2255 motion unless the court informs the litigant of its
intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the recharacterization
will subject subsequent § 2255 motions to the law's "second or
successive" restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity
to withdraw, or to amend, the filing.
37
The Court further explained that:
the very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand
not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also
(2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal.
The "lack of warning" prevents his making an informed judgment in
respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Indeed, an
unwarned pro se litigant's failure to appeal a recharacterization simply
underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence,
an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a § 2255 motion for
purposes of the "second or successive" provision, whether the
unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.
38
In addition to requiring judges to warn habeas petitioners of their
intended recharacterization of their petitions, the Court cautioned trial
judges against interpreting the procedural prescriptions in federal habeas
case law that would "trap the unwary pro se prisoner."39
Another line of cases giving SRLs latitude are those dealing with
the sufficiency of notices of appeal. The Court in Coppedge v. U.S., for
example, took a "liberal view of papers" filed by pro se prisoners, and
found them to be "equivalents of notices of appeal" despite technical
deficiencies.40 This "functional-equivalent doctrine," allowing non-
compliant papers to satisfy the relevant notice-of-appeal rule, was held in
Coppedge and other subsequent decisions41 to properly invoke the
37 Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 377 (2003).
38 Id. at 384. (emphasis added).
39 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520
(1982). Cf, Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), holding that when the court in a habeas
proceeding determines that the state has a timeliness defense to the petition that was not raised, it
"might have informed the State of its obvious computation error and entertained an amendment o
the State's answer." Day at 215. But, "We stress that a district court is not required to doublecheck
the State's math. If, as this Court has held, '[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants,' . . , then, by the same token, they surely have no bligation to assist
attorneys representing the State." Day at 209-10 (internal citations omitted).
40 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 443, n.5 (1962).
41 See, e.g., Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964) (letter to sentencing court held
sufficient), superseded by statute on other grounds; Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996);
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (one early and one late notice and a post-trial motion
collectively held effective though technically deficient); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992)
(premature notice and appellate brief filing within time for filing notice of appeal held sufficient);
Becker v. Montgomery, 582 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (where appellant filed a notice of appeal with a
typed instead of a required original signature, "imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be
226 EQUAL RIGHTS & SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 25:2
appellate court's jurisdiction because they reflected the inmate's intent to
take an appeal from the judgment of the district court.42
Yet, additional language justifying federal courts' refusal to assist
or provide procedural information to pro se litigants is summarized in the
following passage from Pliler v. Ford,43 a recent habeas case:
District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to
pro se litigants ... Explaining the details of federal habeas procedure and
calculating statutes of limitations are tasks normally and properly
performed by trained counsel as a matter of course. Requiring district
courts to advise a pro se litigant in such a manner would undermine
district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers. And, to the extent that
respondent is concerned with a district court's potential to mislead pro se
habeas petitioners, the warnings respondent advocates run the risk of
being misleading themselves.4
4
While repeating some of its stern, early language about trial judges
not being required to personally instruct SRLs or be an advocate for them,
the Court at the same time not only imposes a duty of liberality in
interpretation of their pleadings and submissions generally, it has gone
further to impose certain duties upon trial judge to provide "unwary pro
se prisoners" as well as the state proper notice and opportunity to
respond to procedural traps that may deny them their day in court on the
merits of their claims or defenses. Thus, we see that the Court has given
trial and appellate courts mixed messages about their obligations to SRLs.
Depending on the type of case brought, the cooperativeness of the SRL,
the philosophy of the trial judge about pro se litigation generally, and
other factors make it such that some SRLs receive notices, warnings, and
accommodations, while others do not, without a clear standard
distinguishing who is entitled to them and who is not.
While many of the cases cited above involve prisoners, in Turner
v. Rogers the Court held that Rogers, a civil pro se litigant defending
against a contempt citation in a child support matter,
did not receive clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute
the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding. No one provided
fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate
court.").
42 Lower courts have recognized the distinction between pro se non-compliance with rules
versus imperfect compliance. Latitude has been given to those litigants in cases of imperfect
compliance with pleading rules. See United States v. $41,320 U.S. Currency, 2014 WL 6698426
(D. Maryland).
43 Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (district courts are not required to give the particular
advisements required by the Ninth Circuit before dismissing a pro se petitioner's mixed habeas
petition).
44 Id. at 231-32 (citations omitted). See also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)
(the Supreme Court has "never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").
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him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about
his financial circumstances. The court did not find that Turner was able
to pay his arrearage, but instead left the relevant "finding" section of the
contempt order blank. The court nonetheless found Turner in contempt
and ordered him incarcerated. Under these circumstances Turner's
incarceration violated the Due Process Clause.45
The Court, analyzing the application of the Mathews v. Eldridge46
procedural due process factors, concluded that due process did not require
the appointment of counsel for the respondent SRL. The Court noted one
of the problems with granting the right to legal counsel to respondents in
child support cases, namely, that because most petitioners in such cases
are single mothers without counsel the right would create "an
asymmetry of representation"47 that would significantly alter the nature
of the proceedings. Introducing counsel into the proceedings "could mean
a degree of formality or delay" that would unduly slow payments to those
in need of child support, and "could make the proceedings less fair
overall," increasing the risk of erroneous decisions that would deprive
families of needed support.48 This language indicates this Court's
schizophrenic sensitivity to the challenge facing an SRL who attempts to
litigate a claim or defense against a represented party, as occurred in this
case.
Turner is also relevant to the treatment of SRLs because of the
Court's reasoning, which included a reference to the fact that there were
"substitute procedural safeguards"49 that made it less necessary to
establish a right to counsel in civil contempt cases. The Court noted the
existing procedure in that case provided for "(1) notice to the defendant
that his 'ability to pay' is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2)
the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial
information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to
respond to statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those
triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the
court that the defendant has the ability to pay."50 The Court ultimately
relied upon the existence of these procedural safeguards in holding that
the Due Process Clause, does not automatically require the provision of
counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom support
funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State provides
alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have mentioned
45 .Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 449 (2011).
46 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47 Turner, 564 U.S. at 447.
48 Id.
49 Id.,(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 435).
5o 564 U.S. at 447-48.
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(adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair opportunity to
present, and to dispute, relevant information, and court findings)." 51
The bad news is that Turner represents the death knell for efforts
of civil libertarians to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize an
indigent's right to assistance of counsel in civil cases. The good news is
that the Court recognized for the first time that SRLs face an "asymmetry
of representation," and that states must provide certain "alternative
procedures" for them in civil cases, such as child support matters which
could result in incarceration, as a matter of due process. Whether the
Court will require such alternative procedures to the assistance of counsel
for federal cases, such as judicial assistance, or some other forms of
accommodation, remains to be seen. In the meantime, lower federal
courts have ruled in a variety of civil and criminal contexts that judges
are required to provide a range of forms of assistance, as described in Part
III.
In sum, self-representation is a constitutional and statutory right
under federal law. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject is
sparse and contradictory with respect to whether assistance in the form of
warnings or otherwise is required, and under what circumstances. Judges
or appellate courts less sympathetic to SRLs, who take a hard line, no-
assistance approach, often rely upon the Court's early language stating
that they have no constitutional right to "personal instruction" from the
trial judge.
Given the confusion and lack of uniformity on the issue, Part III
provides guidance for trial judges by summarizing federal appellate
decisions addressing the various forms of required, permissible, and
impermissible forms of judicial assistance.
PART III COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REQUIRED, PERMISSIBLE,
AND IMPERMISSIBLE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
"Assistance" to SRLs has been variously referred to by courts as
accommodations, allowances, leeway, solicitude, latitude, and similar
terms.52 I use "assistance" in this Article to include all such synonyms.
51 Id. at 448.
52 Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[i]mplicit in the right of self-representation
is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants
from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training."); see also
Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that pro se litigants must be accorded
"special solicitude"); McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 81 (2d Cir. 1999) (court errs by
failing to advise a pro se litigant of the nature of such a motion and the consequences of failing to
respond to it properly, unless the opposing party has already provided the pro se litigant with such
notice or it is otherwise clear from the record that the pro se litigant understands the nature of the
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Fitting them into a typology for judges' guidance is not easy because of
the variety of forms and contexts in which the question of assistance
arises.
The decision of a judge to assist or not assist SRLs however
"assistance" is defined is affected by multiple variables. The judge's
philosophy regarding self-representation generally will certainly affect
his or her decision to assist or not. Some judges believe strongly that the
SRL has "made his bed and must now lie in it," and are opposed to pro
se litigation generally. Other judges are more sympathetic to the plight of
SRLs who have a legitimate claim or defense, and who are thwarted from
accomplishing their legal objective due to lack of knowledge of
substantive law, procedure, or both. Whether the SRL is a prisoner or not
may also affect the assistance decision. Whether the SRL is "forced" to
represent him or herself for economic reasons or is doing so voluntarily
is another factor in a judge's assistance decision. The complexity of the
case and the relative competence of the SRL to litigate it are also relevant.
A judge may believe that assistance, where warranted, is more justified
in a criminal versus a civil case. One SRL may be granted more assistance
than another because he or she is more sympathetic than another. The
procedural posture of the case will also be a factor in a judge's decision
to provide or refuse assistance. Additionally, assistance may be warranted
at one stage of the litigation but not another.
Creating a typology of forms of assistance is challenging. "Active"
and "passive" is one way to categorize and distinguish between forms of
assistance. Active assistance would mean, for example, providing a
notice or warning about a matter of procedure or substance, or otherwise
actively assisting the SRL to accomplish what he or she is trying to do.
Passive assistance would include allowing the filing of a late paper where
there has been imperfect rule compliance, rather than non-compliance.
Assistance could also be categorized by the stage or posture of the
litigation; it could be categorized as taking pretrial, trial, or post-trial
forms. In addition, the distinction between procedure and substance
might be another way to categorize forms of assistance, such t at a judge
motion); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n. 2 (3d Cir.1993) ("we have traditionally given pro se
litigants greater leeway where they have not followed the technical rules of pleading and
procedure"); Philos Technologies, Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 858-59 (7
t
h Cir. 2011)
(heightened judicial solicitude is justified in light of the difficulties of the pro se litigant in
mastering the procedural and substantive requirements of the legal structure);; Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10h Cir. 2005) (some allowances are made for the
pro se plaintiffs failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his
poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements); United
States v. Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1316-17 (1 1th Cir. 2011) ("[I]mplicit in the right to self-representation
is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants
from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training;" pro se party's
misunderstanding drove his decision not to testify; by not correcting Ly's misunderstanding, the
court reinforced Ly's mistaken view).
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may believe the former is proper, but not the latter. 53 This of course raises
the question of what is "substance" and "procedure," a question not easily
answered. Despite the categorization, a judge would still need to know
whether this or that form of assistance at this or that trial stage is required,
permissible, or impermissible.
After reviewing over 300 federal decisions, I have found it
preferable to group assistance forms based both on (1) their nature, as,
e.g., relating to the right to (or waiver of) counsel, pleadings, notices or
warnings, discovery, opportunities granted, evidentiary rulings or
testimony, and (2) whether the assistance falls into the required,
permissible, or impermissible categories. These are presented in the
followed three tables. Not every category in the tables below has
examples of each form of assistance. The sample size is limited to federal
appellate cases on the subject, retrieved using multiple search queries
relating to SRLs and judicial assistance, broadly defined. There are far
more district court decisions on the subject, but their analysis is a matter
for future research. Both civil and criminal cases noting required,
permissible, or impermissible forms of judicial assistance are presented.
Table 1. Required Assistance54
Counsel or Waiver of Counsel (Criminal)
It is important for trial courts to do all in their power to ensure
every defendant, from the most cooperative to the most
obstreperous, is informed of the risks of proceeding pro se and is
prevented from waiving counsel without sufficient knowledge of
the protections he is surrendering. Before a court concludes a
defendant has knowingly waived his right to counsel, the defendant
"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what
he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." To that end, the
best practice is for district courts to begin by attempting to engage
the defendant in a full discussion of the dangers of self-
53 See Jona Goldschmidt, et al., Lawyers' Perceptions of the Fairness of Judicial Assistance to
Self-RepresentedLitigants, 30 WINDSORY.B. ON ACCESS TO JUST. 139, 170-71(2012) (noting that
the survey of family lawyers do not object to "procedural" assistance but do object to the court
giving "substantive" assistance).
54 Here and in the next two tables I generally paraphrase the holding, but in some cases quote
directly from the court's opinion.
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representation whenever a defendant expresses a desire to waive his
right to counsel, whether affirmatively or by his conduct.55
"A more searching or formal inquiry" is required when a defendant
wishes to waive his right to counsel at trial because "the full
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" are more
substantial and less obvious at trial than during earlier stages of
criminal proceedings.56
SRL should be permitted to proceed pro se even if he had counsel
pretrial. "
"If the appointment of new counsel is not warranted, it can be
denied. If a defendant refuses to proceed with counsel and also
refuses to proceed pro se, the proper course is to move forward
with existing counsel. This approach preserves the right to counsel-
which is the presumptive default position-while allowing the court
to manage the case.'"58
While appointment of standby counsel is preferred, the presence of
advisory counsel in the courtroom or the defendant's acquiescence
in counsel's participation does not, by itself, relieve the district
court of its responsibility to ensure that defendant's waiver of
counsel is knowingly and intelligently made. Anything less than
" United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2008). "So long as the trial court is
assured the defendant (1) understands the choices before him, (2) knows the potential dangers of
proceeding pro se, and (3) has rejected the lawyer to whom he is constitutionally entitled, the court
may, in the exercise of its discretion, discharge counsel or (preferably, as occurred here) provide
for counsel to remain in a standby capacity. In such cases, a Faretta-like monologue will suffice."
Id. at 1267-68. This states the general rule announced in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(1975) ("Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order
competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open'," citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
56 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298-99 (1988) ("[R]ecognizing the enormous importance and
role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial, we have imposed the most rigorous restrictions on the
information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the procedures that must be observed, before
permitting him to waive his right to counsel at trial."); see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 89
(2004) ("Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel ... must be rigorously
conveyed.").
57 It is equally true, however, that a defendant's "pre-trial decision to proceed with counsel does not
constitute an absolute waiver of his right to represent himself." ... The principal focus of a trial
judge's colloquy should be to determine whether the accused has "knowingly and intelligently"
elected to relinquish the benefits of appointed counsel .... Where a pro se defendant lacks the
ability to defend himself adequately or vacillates in his resolve to continue without representation,
the judge can appoint stand-by counsel to assist the defendant in representing himself ... The
entire procedure requires "not only an intricate assessment of the defendant's intent, knowledge,
and capacity, but a strong measure of patience as well." Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 100 (2d
Cir. 1994).
5' Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2004).
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full representation by counsel raises the question of valid waiver of
the right to counsel. Even if appointment of standby counsel is
contemplated, the district court must fulfill its affirmative
responsibility of ensuring defendant is aware of the hazards and
disadvantages of self-representation. 9
A potentially unruly defendant may and should be clearly
forewarned that deliberate dilatory or obstructive behavior may
operate in effect as a waiver of his pro se rights and, in that event,
amicus [standby counsel] will be ready to assume exclusive control
of the defense."6
In habeas proceeding, post-trial letter to state court by self-
represented prisoner requesting appointment of counsel,
supplemented by father's letter describing defendant's indigency,
that were not acted upon by trial judge, are sufficient to establish a
violation of right to counsel on appeal.
61
Given the complexity of the (Bivens action) case, a competent
appointed counsel could have made a difference in the outcome; a
lawyer would have been able to help the SRL untangle the medical
and legal questions in the case, and the court would probably not
have granted summary judgment had counsel been appointed. The
court abused its discretion in denying the motion for appointed
counsel.62
Pleadings
An SRL's se complaint is to be read liberally. The court should not
dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a
liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.63
51 United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 959-60 (10th Cir. 1987).
60 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Jona Goldschmidt,
Judging the Effectiveness of Standby Counsel: Are they Phone Psychics? Theatrical Understudies?
Or Both? 24 SO. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 133 (2015) (discussing the role of standby counsel and
the standard for determining their effectiveness).
61 Magee v. Payton, 343 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1965) ("It is not disputed that the petitioner did not
in fact have the assistance of counsel in appealing his conviction, and we think the letter from the
petitioner's father constituted a sufficient assertion of indigency to eliminate any meritorious
challenge on that point.").
6' Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2004). See also, James v. Eli, 846 F.3d 951, 953 (7th
Cir. 2017) ("[L]awsuits involving complex medical evidence are particularly challenging for pro
se litigants... If a pro se plaintiff in such a case is unable despite his best efforts to obtain a lawyer
and a medical expert, and if the case would have a chance of success were the plaintiff represented
by counsel, the trial judge should endeavor to obtain them for him.") (citations omitted).
63Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is
particularly so when the plaintiff SRL alleges that her civil rights have been violated. McEachin,
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SRL complaints are to be liberally construed, and courts may
construe them as having named defendants who are mentioned only
in the body, but not the caption, of the complaint.64
The fact is the SRL pointed to this [state-created anger] theory,
which falls within the due process rubric he generally invoked. If
the court can reasonably read pro se pleadings to state a valid claim
on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the
plaintiffs failure to cite proper legal authority and his confusion of
various legal theories.65
A district court must examine the SRL's complaint to see whether
the facts alleged, or the set of facts which the plaintiff might be
able to prove, could very well provide a basis for recovery under
any of the civil rights acts. The Court, in considering the
defendants' motion to dismiss, will not permit technical pleading
requirements to defeat the vindication of any constitutional rights
which the SRL alleges, however inartfully, to have been
infringed.66
As a matter of "best practices" or general guidance offered to all
SRLs, they should be asked to organize their amended complaints
along these lines: (i) the alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date on
which such misconduct occurred; (iii) the names of each and every
individual who participated in such misconduct; (iv) where
appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct occurred;
and, (v) the nexus between such misconduct and the SRL's civil
and/or constitutional rights. However, a threat to dismiss the action
for failure to comply with these requirements "is another matter
altogether. Neither our rules nor our precedents authorize a district
court to take such a step. As the Supreme Court has observed,
'Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.' Accordingly, a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations-such as the dates of misconduct and the names
357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). The "dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is
appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases." Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d
Cir. 2008).
64 Donald v. Cook County Sheriffs Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 559 (7th Cir. 1996).
65 Waugh v. Dow, 617 Fed. Appx. 867, 874-75 (10th Cir. 2015), citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
66 Canty v. Richmond Police Dep't, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1399-1400 (E.D.Va.1974), affirmed, 526
F.2d 587 (4 Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976).
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of 'each and every individual' involved in the misconduct. There is
no basis for the imposition of such mandatory guidelines."67
District court should rule on plaintiff SRL's motion for
appointment of counsel before dismissal.68
SRLs' imperfect compliance, as distinguished from non-
compliance, requires courts to apply liberality to their papers.
Appellate courts must apply notice-of-appeal requirements liberally
in the case of prisoner SRLs and permit the filing of a document
that is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal even if
imperfect in some respect where the prisoner "did all he could"
under the circumstances.
69
Notice or Warning
7°
Where an SRL fails to allege a jurisdictional amount or other basis
for federal jurisdiction, the district court should apprise him of the
availability of 42 U.S.C. s 1983 and 28 U.S.C. s 1343(3).71
District court should advise an Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
SRL when the complaint omits an indispensable party from his
complaint.72
In some circuits the court (or movant's counsel) is required to
provide "fair notice" and instructions to SRLs regarding the manner
of responding to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.73
67 Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
68 Brown Bey v. United States, 720 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1983).
69 Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996). The "functional equivalent" principle was first
applied in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444, n. 5 (1962) (noting that the principle is
applied based on the "liberal view of papers filed by indigent and incarcerated defendants, as
equivalent notices of appeal."). It was also applied in the non-prisoner (non-pro se) context in
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) ("It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis
of such mere technicalities."). Then, in Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that a document filed in the circuit court pro se, intended to serve as an appellate brief,
should qualify as a notice of appeal. See also, Becker v. Montgomery, 582 U.S. 757, 767 (2001)
(imperfections in pro se prisoner's notice of appeal of the dismissal of his § 1983 complaint here,
inclusion of appellant's typed name without a signature "should not be fatal where no genuine
doubt exists about who is appealing, and from what judgment, to which appellate court.").
70 Notices or warnings to SRLs are often equated with improper advocacy. The examples provided
here show they are a requirement of due process and the judicial duty to ensure a fair trial.
7' Burris v. State Dep't of Public Welfare, 491 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1974).
71 Wilburn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986).
7' Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975); Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 284
(7th Cir. 1992) (pro se litigants must be given notice of consequences of failing to file affidavits in
response to motion for summary judgment). Accord Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9
t
h Cir. 1998) (fair notice of the
summary judgment requirement naturally follows from our policy of liberal construction in favor
of pro se litigants; the purpose of the Federal Rules to eliminate "procedural booby traps" which
could prevent "unsophisticated litigants" from ever having their day in court); Somerville v. Hall,
2 F.3d 1563, 1564 (11th Cir. 1993); Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1992). But see
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Court may require counsel for summary judgment movant to assist
district judges in bearing their (the judges') burden of fair notice to
include in their motions for summary judgment directed at actions
by SRLs a short and plain statement of the manner in which to
respond to such motions.74
The fair-notice requirement regarding summary judgment or
motions to dismiss must be given contemporaneously with such
motion filings.
75
The district court should afford SRLs special solicitude before
granting the [defendant's] motion for summary judgment. The court
also has an obligation to make certain that the SRL is aware of and
understands the consequences of their failure to comply with the
Local Rules. Trial judges must make some effort to protect a party
[proceeding pro se] from waiving a right to be heard because of his
or her lack of legal knowledge.76
A district court errs in granting summary judgment against an SRL
where it fails to treat his verified complaint as an affidavit.
77
Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that he rule applies only to
pro se prisoners). Other courts have rejected the "fair notice" duty. McDaniels v. McKinna, 96
Fed.Appx. 575, *578 (10th Cir. 2004) ("While we construe pleadings filed by a pro se litigant
liberally, the courts do not serve as thepro se litigant's advocate, andpro se litigants are expected
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as all litigants must."); Williams v. Browman, 981
F.2d 901, 903 04 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that such notice is unnecessary); Jacobsen v. Filler, 790
F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court should not tell a plaintiff SRL how to respond to
a motion for summary judgment and should refrain from open-ended participation in pro se civil
cases); Martin v. Harrison Cnty. Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); Brock v.
Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1988) (District court did not err in advising SRLs that
their response to defendants' first summary judgment motion could not be considered as a response
to their second summary judgment motion: "We adopt his rule in this case. When a person such as
either defendant in this case chooses to represent himself, he should expect no special treatment
which prefers him over others who are represented by attorneys.").
7' Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940,
n. 6 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Because the defendants in pro se prisoner cases are ordinarily institutional
officials or employees, and are represented by the Attorney General or other counsel regularly
retained by the governmental entities involved, we express no view as to the methods the district
court may employ, including sanctions, to ensure that defendants provide proper notice rather than
imposing that burden on the overworked district courts.").
75 Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d at 939 ("The assumption that the required notice will be given
contemporaneously with the summary judgment motion is prevalent, even though not explicitly
announced by these courts as an affirmative requirement. Given that the purpose of the fair notice
requirement is to ensure that unsophisticated and unassisted litigants do not succumb to 'procedural
booby traps [that] could prevent [them] from ever having their day in court,' .. . it is essential that
such notice be provided at the time when the defendants' motions are made, not a year or more in
advance. Otherwise, the 'procedural booby traps' we sought to avoid... may well prevent pro se
prisoners 'from ever having their day in court'.").
76 Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).
77 Neal 963 F.2d at 457.
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An SRL should receive meaningful notice of what is required of
him, but the court is not required or permitted to act as counsel for
any party.78
Magistrate is required to provide SRL with notice of the right to
object within 10 days of receipt of a Report and Recommendation
to district court. If such notice is given and the report is not
objected to, a district court's judgment based on the report may
only be reversed upon plain error or manifest injustice.79
District court should have notified plaintiff SRL of consequences of
failure to comply with briefing schedule before dismissing
complaint).80
District courts should give SRL notice of need to file new notice of
appeal after denial of Rule 59(e) motion).81
Before acting on its own initiative in a habeas proceeding where a
calculation error has been made for limitations purposes, a court
must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present
their positions. 82
The district court may not use the same jury sequentially for two
unrelated cases brought by an SRL unless he or she is fully
informed and consent is given.
83
71 Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983).
7' Douglas v. United Services Auto. Assoc., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Because
Douglass was not warned that failure to object to the legal conclusions in the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation would restrict appellate review of them to plain error, he falls within
an exception to our new appellate forfeiture rule for accepted unobjected-to proposed findings and
conclusions.").
80 Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir.1991).
81 Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1985) ("But we know from past experience
that this particular wrinkle in the appellate rules [i.e., inter-relationship between Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e)
and F.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)] is a trap for the unwary into which many appellants, especially those not
represented by counsel (and most prisoners are not), have fallen, with dire consequences ince there
is no way they can reinstate their appeal if the second notice of appeal is untimely. The mistake
these litigants make is thoroughly understandable. The problem is not that Rule 4(a)(4) is unclear
it is not but that it is complicated to a lay understanding and is buried in Rule 4 of the appellate
rules, which anyway are less familiar than the rules of procedure. The idea that the first notice of
appeal lapses rather than merely being suspended is not intuitive, so unless a litigant has a pretty
good understanding of how Rule 59 of the procedure rules interacts with Rule 4 of the appellate
rules, he is apt to fall into the same hole into which Mr. Averhart has disappeared. It seems hardly
in keeping with the spirit of the federal rules to impose such forfeitures so regularly on persons
without legal knowledge or representation.").
8 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006).
83 Johnson v. Schmidt, 83 F.3d 37, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The practice is fraught with dangers.
First, if the evidence at the first trial persuades the jury that the plaintiff is not a credible witness, it
will be very difficult for the same jury to make an independent assessment of the plaintiffs
credibility at the trial of the second case. Second, evidence prejudicial to the plaintiff might be
injected into the first trial, either by the defendants' design or through unexpected volunteering by
a witness. If this occurs in the first trial, the plaintiff might be obliged to accept the limited comfort
of a judge's 'curative' instruction to disregard the prejudicial testimony, but the use of the same
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Opportunity Granted
The court should afford the prisoner SRL an opportunity to
discover the identities of the proper defendants from the warden,
from his personal knowledge, the personal knowledge of his
subordinates, or the records of the institution, and should advise
him how to proceed, or permit amendment of the pleadings to bring
that person or persons before the court. 84
A judge may not refuse to grant disabled SRL oral argument
because of her disability, where she had no lawyer to argue in her
place."
Evidence or Testimony
Where a self-represented criminal defendant misunderstands his
right to testify, believing he could only do so upon being
questioned by a lawyer, district judge has a duty to correct his
misunderstanding and advise him that he can testify in narrative
form. 86
jury to decide the second case unnecessarily subjects the plaintiff to the risk that the "cure" will not
suffice.") at 38-39.
84 Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Donald v. Cook County
Sheriffs Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hen the substance of a pro se civil rights
complaint indicates the existence of claims against individual officials not specifically named in
the caption of the complaint, the district court must provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to
amend the complaint. To the extent the plaintiff faces barriers to determining the identities of the
unnamed defendants, the court must assist the plaintiff in conducting the necessary investigation.");
Berndt v. State of Tenn., 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986) (remanding for amendment when "the
complaint, in substance, clearly indicated that the [unnamed] staff and authorities [rather than the
official body named as defendant] are the real parties-defendants" in spite of plaintiffs failure to
request leave to amend); Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983) (prisoner SRL
"should have the opportunity to amend his caption and serve the additional prison officials named
or described in the complaint"); Wilger v. Dept. of Pensions and Sec., 593 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir.
1979) (remanding to provide "reasonable opportunity o amend" where "in their pro se complaint
the [plaintiffs] made allegations which indicate that there may be individuals (whether state
officials or others) who are amenable to suit in federal court"); Billman v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 56
F.3d 785, 788 90 (7th Cir. 1995); Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 87 88 (7th Cir. 1980) (when
"party is ignorant of defendants' true identity, it is unnecessary to name them until their identity can
be learned through discovery or through the aid of the trial court."); Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254,
1257 (8th Cir. 1985) ("dismissal is proper only when it appears that the true identity of the
defendant cannot be learned through discovery or the court's intervention"); Santiago v. Wood, 904
F.2d 673 (11 th Cir. 1990) (abuse of discretion to deny Rule 60(b) motion to amend complaint o
name the appropriate institutional defendant).
85 Reed v. Illinois, 808 F.3d 1103, 1108 ( 7
t
h Cir. 2015)("Apt is the observation of the Supreme
Court in Tennessee v. Lane,... that Title II of the ADA was passed in part to provide equal access
to courts for the disabled: 'The unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of
judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy
the problem of disability discrimination'." Id. (citations omitted).
86 United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2011). Cf United States v.
Beckton, 740 F.3d 303, 307-08 (4th Cir. 2014) (trial judge did not deny self-represented efendant
a fair trial by refusing to allow him to testify in narrative fashion and compelling him to choose
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Table 2. Permissible Assistance
between testifying pro se in question-answer form in response to questions from standby counsel
or not testifying at all).
8 United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1993).
8 Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654
(7th Cir. 2007) (en bane)). Whether to recruit counsel "is a difficult decision: Almost everyone
would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers
willing and able to volunteer for these cases .... Consequently, '[d]istrict courts are ... placed in
the unenviable position of identifying, among the sea of people lacking counsel, those who need
counsel the most'." Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). "In
deciding whether the district court abused its discretion, we ask 'whether the difficulty of the case
factually and legally-exceeds the particular plaintiffs capacity as a layperson to coherently
present it to the judge or jury himself.' . . . 'We ... examine both the difficulties posed by the
particular case and the capabilities of the plaintiff to litigate such a case'." 755 F.3d at 565.
" Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008). Accord: U.S. v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 374, 376
(8th Cir. 1978). Both cases rely upon Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, n. 46 ("A defendant
who chooses to represent himself may request the court to appoint an 'advisory' or 'standby'
counsel to assist him in the presentation of the defense.").
Counsel or Waiver of Counsel (Criminal)
The court's power to compel an attorney to continue through the
trial as uncompensated, standby counsel in a criminal case is based
not only on fairness to the defendant, but also on a court's inherent
power to compel an attorney to continue to provide services at trial
in order to further the efficient processing and disposition of its
caseload.87
The court has discretion to appoint volunteer counsel if an indigent
SRL with a meritorious case makes a reasonable but unsuccessful
attempt to obtain counsel, unless the court determines that, given
the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff appears competent to litigate
it himself. 88
Even if the right to self-representation has been validly invoked, a
judge may qualify it by appointing standby counsel, with or
without the defendant's consent, to aid the accused if and when the
accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused
in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation
is necessary or to relieve the judge of the need to explain and
enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant
in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the
defendant's achievement of her own clearly indicated goals.89
District court may permit hybrid representation in its discretion,
but SRL does not have a constitutional right under the Sixth
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Amendment to combine self-representation with representation by
counsel.90
In the face of the SRL's knowing and intelligent Sixth Amendment
waiver, the district court does not violate his right to counsel by
refusing to allow standby counsel to represent he runaway SRL
during the final days of the trial.91
Co-counsel and advisory counsel are terms that have gained
distinct meanings. "Advisory counsel is generally used to describe
the situation when a self-represented defendant is given technical
assistance by an attorney in the courtroom, but the attorney does
not participate in the actual conduct of the trial. In the co-counsel
situation, the attorney may participate directly in the trial
proceedings with the defendant (examining witnesses, objecting to
evidence, etc.). The Supreme Court and this circuit have
recognized the efficacy of hybrid representation to aid pro se
defendants and protect the integrity of the trial process."92
A trial judge does not violate a self-represented defendant's Sixth
Amendment right o counsel by permitting standby counsel (only)
to participate in bench conferences requested by either defendant
or the prosecution.93
Requiring that defendant use advisory counsel and screen all
motions through counsel is not an impermissible limitation on
right of self-representation absent showing that participation of
advisory counsel undermined jury perception of the Faretta right
of self-representation, and trial court's admonitions, which occur
outside jury's presence, appear to involve a need for assistance in
procedural matters, and where there is no showing that counsel's
participation eroded the self-represented defendant's actual control
of the defense.94
90 United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1988), citing United States v. Mosely,
810 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 841, 108 S.Ct. 129, 98 L.Ed.2d 87 (1987); United
States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (This does not mean that hybrid representation
is forbidden; rather, "it is to be employed sparingly and, as a rule, is available only in the district
court's discretion."); United States. v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 981 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
9' United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 649 (11 th Cir. 2014).
Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We agree with the Tenth Circuit. If the
right to co-counsel is not of constitutional dimension . . we fail to see why the right to advisory
counsel should be afforded higher status. The decision to allow a defendant to proceed with either
form of hybrid representation is best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.") (citations
omitted). But see, United States v. Olson, 576 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e have rejected
the view that a defendant has a right both to represent himself and to be represented by counsel
even if a request for such hybrid representation is made.").
9 Hicks v. Duncan, 173 F.3d 860, *1 (9th Cir. 1999).
9 United States v. Walsh, 742 F.2d 1006, 1007 (6th Cir. 1984).
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It is both permissible and good practice for a trial court to require
that appointed counsel represent a self-represented defendant
excluded from the courtroom for disruptive behavior.
9 5
District court, in keeping with its broad supervisory powers, has
broad discretion to guide what, if any, assistance standby, or
advisory, counsel may provide to a defendant conducting his own
defense.96
Appointment of Counsel (Civil)
In deciding to appoint volunteer counsel to an indigent, prisoner
SRL, the court, in determining whether the latter can competently
represent himself, may not take into consideration the fact that the
prisoner has a jailhouse lawyer assisting him. The court should
consider his educational level, IQ, functional literacy, experience
with civil litigation, ability to investigate crucial facts, and the
factual and legal complexity of the case.9 7
Pleadings
District court, in screening an SRL's complaint to decide if IFP (in
forma pauperis) status is warranted or whether a 12(b)(6) motion
should be granted, may clarify an unclear complaint by
interviewing the SRL and making a transcript or recording of the
interview (which will usually be conducted telephonically). The
interview must be limited to elucidating the plaintiffs claim, and
not allowed to become a determination of its merits. A judge who
does not recruit a lawyer for the SRL in such a case should at least
consider making a modest effort to assist the him in articulating
his claims.98
Discovery
A judge may order simplified interrogatories so that the SRL could
respond as simply and conveniently as possible. A judge may also
grant the SRL an extension of time in which to respond to the
discovery requests.99
5 Davis v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008).
96 United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The limits placed by the court on
Lawrence's use of his standby counsel in this instance were reasonable. It simply restricted the
standby counsel's advice to procedural matters.")
" Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2014). A claim of abuse of discretion in
refusing to appoint counsel requires a showing of prejudice. "As noted, prejudice in this context
means 'a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the
outcome of the litigation .... ' '[P]rejudice may be established by a litigant's poor performance
before or during trial." ... If the plaintiff 'was incapable of engaging in any investigation[ ] or
locating and presenting key witnesses or evidence' he can establish the requisite prejudice... Id.
at 566.
" Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 395 (7th Cir. 2015).
" Settle v. Brim, 1998 WL 738337, *1 (10th Cir. 1998).
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District judge accommodated the SRL by rescheduling his
deposition multiple times and ordering that the deposition take
place at the courthouse in three sessions totaling no more than
seven hours (based on plaintiffs alleged anxiety disorder). 100
SRLs are granted special solicitude regarding court-ordered
sanctions.101
Opportunity Granted (or Denied)
A trial judge does not violate self-represented efendant's Sixth
Amendment right o counsel by permitting standby counsel (only)
to participate in bench conferences requested by either defendant
or the prosecution. 102
Evidence or Testimony
A judge in a bench trial with a plaintiff SRL may request that
certain individuals be the first witnesses, and may direct the
defendants to proceed first in examining these witnesses. The court
may ask all the witnesses a significant number of questions, at
times dominating parts of the examination, and may permit the
parties to make a liberal supplementation of the record upon
conclusion of trial. 103
The trial judge may question a witness if he deems it necessary to
clarify a matter, or to develop more fully the facts for the benefit
of the jury. 104
District court may order the SRL to submit to the court and
opposing counsel the questions he intends to ask witnesses on
direct examination, where court received objections from the
100 Manigualte v. C.W. Post of Long Island University, 533 Fed. Appx. 4, *5 (2d Cir. 2013).
101 Int'l Business Properties v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 65 F.3d 175, *2 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize
that pro se litigants are granted special solicitude with regard to court-ordered sanctions.").
10 Hicks v. Duncan, 173 F.3d 860, *1 (9th Cir. 1999).
103 Cranberg v. Consumers Union of U.S., 756 F.2d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The judge's
participation and evidentiary rulings tended to assist Cranberg, a pro se litigant who represented
himself well, though he lacked familiarity with procedural rules .... When a pro se litigant, even
one as skillful as Cranberg, goes to trial against a party represented by a member of the bar, the
responsibility of the trial judge may warrant participation which differs markedly from what would
be appropriate to a trial between adversaries represented by counsel. The record of this trial reveals
ajudge conscious of his duty and conscientious in its discharge. Rather than prejudicing Cranberg's
position, we see the judge's efforts as attempts to enlighten it. We are satisfied that he measures
taken below to develop and control the proof were reasonable and directed towards reaching a just
decision." Id. at 392.)
"04 United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975). The court, however, also held: "For
the trial judge to assume the responsibility of examining witnesses for either party would change
the judicial role from one of impartiality to one of advocacy. The fact that a defendant represents
himself does not alter the judicial role nor does it impose any new obligation on the trial judge. The
defendant under those circumstances must assume the responsibility for his inability to elicit
testimony." Id. at *12.
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defendants so that it could rule upon them in advance of trial, and
such a procedure is not a denial of due process. 105
The district judge may raise objections on self-represented
defendant's behalf and give him certain legal advice. 106
The trial judge may assist SRL by correcting some of her
misunderstandings of law and instructing her on what kind of
proof she needs offer. 107
A trial court may ask questions for such purposes as clarifying
ambiguities, correcting misstatements, or obtaining information
needed to make rulings.108
The trial judge may actively participate and give his own
impressions of the evidence or question witnesses, as an aid to the
jury, so long as he does not step across the line and become an
advocate for one side. 109.
Table 3. Impermissible Assistance
Counsel or Waiver of Counsel (Criminal)
The court's power to compel an attorney to continue through the
trial as uncompensated, standby counsel in a criminal case is based
not only on fairness to the defendant, but also on a court's inherent
power to compel an attorney to continue to provide services at trial
105 Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 799 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1986) ("In devising this
unusual procedure, the court made it clear that it was doing so in order to help the trial proceed
more efficiently, to assist the pro se plaintiff in presenting his case to the jury, and to avoid
unnecessary expense, confusion and embarrassment for him during the trial. In a post-trial
conference, the district court articulated, for purposes of making a record for this anticipated appeal,
the difficulties that trial courts face in trying civil cases before a jury when the plaintiff is not
represented by counsel. The district judge described the problems that arise when a pro se plaintiff
attempts to question himself, including the incessant objections from opposing counsel. The district
court concluded that 'these [section 1983 pro se trials] are the most difficult cases we have in the
district court'.").
106 United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) ("A pro se
defendant is subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence as defendants who are represented
by counsel.... The district judge was extremely solicitous in handling Merrill's trial, and appointed
advisory counsel to assist Merrill in the conduct of his pro se defense. On repeated occasions, the
judge raised objections to evidence offered by the prosecution. Similarly, more than once during
the trial, the judge excluded government counsel from the courtroom and provided Merrill with
sound legal advice. The district judge made every reasonable effort to protect Merrill's right to a
fair trial as well as his right to represent himself.").
107 Scott v. Rosenthal, 53 Fed. Appx. 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2002).
108 United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1996).
109Id. at 385.
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in order to further the efficient processing and disposition of its
caseload. 110
The court has discretion to appoint volunteer counsel if an indigent
SRL with a meritorious case makes a reasonable but unsuccessful
attempt to obtain counsel, unless the court determines that, given
the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff appears competent to litigate
it himself. "'
Even if the right to self-representation has been validly invoked, a
judge may qualify it by appointing standby counsel, with or
without the defendant's consent, to aid the accused if and when the
accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused
in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation
is necessary or to relieve the judge of the need to explain and
enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant
in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the
defendant's achievement of her own clearly indicated goals.112
District court may permit hybrid representation in its discretion,
but SRL does not have a constitutional right under the Sixth
Amendment to combine self-representation with representation by
counsel. 113
In the face of the SRL's knowing and intelligent Sixth Amendment
waiver, the district court does not violate his right to counsel by
refusing to allow standby counsel to represent he runaway SRL
during the final days of the trial. 
114
..0 United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1993).
... Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654
(7th Cir. 2007) (en bane)). Whether to recruit counsel "is a difficult decision: Almost everyone
would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers
willing and able to volunteer for these cases .... Consequently, '[d]istrict courts are ... placed in
the unenviable position of identifying, among the sea of people lacking counsel, those who need
counsel the most'." Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). "In
deciding whether the district court abused its discretion, we ask 'whether the difficulty of the case
factually and legally-exceeds the particular plaintiffs capacity as a layperson to coherently
present it to the judge or jury himself.' . . . 'We ... examine both the difficulties posed by the
particular case and the capabilities of the plaintiff to litigate such a case'." 755 F.3d at 565.
"' Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008). Accord: U.S. v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 374, 376
(8th Cir. 1978). Both cases rely upon Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, n. 46 ("A defendant
who chooses to represent himself may request the court to appoint an 'advisory' or 'standby'
counsel to assist him in the presentation of the defense.").
"' United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1988), citing United States v. Mosely,
810 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 841, 108 S.Ct. 129, 98 L.Ed.2d 87 (1987); United
States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (This does not mean that hybrid representation
is forbidden; rather, "it is to be employed sparingly and, as a rule, is available only in the district
court's discretion."); United States. v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 981 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
114 United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 649 (llth Cir. 2014).
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Co-counsel and advisory counsel are terms that have gained
distinct meanings. "Advisory counsel is generally used to describe
the situation when a self-represented defendant is given technical
assistance by an attorney in the courtroom, but the attorney does
not participate in the actual conduct of the trial. In the co-counsel
situation, the attorney may participate directly in the trial
proceedings with the defendant (examining witnesses, objecting to
evidence, etc.). The Supreme Court and this circuit have
recognized the efficacy of hybrid representation to aid pro se
defendants and protect the integrity of the trial process." 
11 5
A trial judge does not violate a self-represented defendant's Sixth
Amendment right o counsel by permitting standby counsel (only)
to participate in bench conferences requested by either defendant
or the prosecution. 116
Requiring that defendant use advisory counsel and screen all
motions through counsel is not an impermissible limitation on
right of self-representation absent showing that participation of
advisory counsel undermined jury perception of the Faretta right
of self-representation, and trial court's admonitions, which occur
outside jury's presence, appear to involve a need for assistance in
procedural matters, and where there is no showing that counsel's
participation eroded the self-represented defendant's actual control
of the defense."11
It is both permissible and good practice for a trial court to require
that appointed counsel represent a self-represented defendant
excluded from the courtroom for disruptive behavior.11 8
District court, in keeping with its broad supervisory powers, has
broad discretion to guide what, if any, assistance standby, or
advisory, counsel may provide to a defendant conducting his own
defense. 1 9
115 Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We agree with the Tenth Circuit. If the
right to co-counsel is not of constitutional dimension . . we fail to see why the right to advisory
counsel should be afforded higher status. The decision to allow a defendant to proceed with either
form of hybrid representation is best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.") (citations
omitted). But see, United States v. Olson, 576 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e have rejected
the view that a defendant has a right both to represent himself and to be represented by counsel
even if a request for such hybrid representation is made.").
116 Hicks v. Duncan, 173 F.3d 860, *1 (9th Cir. 1999).
117 United States v. Walsh, 742 F.2d 1006, 1007 (6th Cir. 1984).
118 Davis v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008).
... United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The limits placed by the court
on Lawrence's use of his standby counsel in this instance were reasonable. It simply restricted the
standby counsel's advice to procedural matters.")
2019] FORMS OF FED. JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 245
Appointment of Counsel (Civil)
In deciding to appoint volunteer counsel to an indigent, prisoner
SRL, the court, in determining whether the latter can competently
represent himself, may not take into consideration the fact that the
prisoner has a jailhouse lawyer assisting him. The court should
consider his educational level, IQ, functional literacy, experience
with civil litigation, ability to investigate crucial facts, and the
factual and legal complexity of the case. 120
Pleadings
District court, in screening an SRL's complaint to decide if IFP (in
forma pauperis) status is warranted or whether a 12(b)(6) motion
should be granted, may clarify an unclear complaint by
interviewing the SRL and making a transcript or recording of the
interview (which will usually be conducted telephonically). The
interview must be limited to elucidating the plaintiffs claim, and
not allowed to become a determination of its merits. A judge who
does not recruit a lawyer for the SRL in such a case should at least
consider making a modest effort to assist the him in articulating
his claims. 121
Discovery
A judge may order simplified interrogatories so that the SRL could
respond as simply and conveniently as possible. A judge may also
grant the SRL an extension of time in which to respond to the
discovery requests. 122
District judge accommodated the SRL by rescheduling his
deposition multiple times and ordering that the deposition take
place at the courthouse in three sessions totaling no more than
seven hours (based on plaintiffs alleged anxiety disorder). 123
SRLs are granted special solicitude regarding court-ordered
sanctions. 124
"0 Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2014). A claim of abuse of discretion in
refusing to appoint counsel requires a showing of prejudice. "As noted, prejudice in this context
means 'a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the
outcome of the litigation .... ' '[P]rejudice may be established by a litigant's poor performance
before or during trial." ... If the plaintiff 'was incapable of engaging in any investigation[ ] or
locating and presenting key witnesses or evidence' he can establish the requisite prejudice... Id.
at 566.
Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 395 (7th Cir. 2015).
Settle v. Brim, 1998 WL 738337, *1 (10th Cir. 1998).
Manigualte v. C.W. Post of Long Island University, 533 Fed. Appx. 4, *5 (2d Cir. 2013).
2 Int'l Business Properties v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 65 F.3d 175, *2 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize
that pro se litigants are granted special solicitude with regard to court-ordered sanctions.").
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Opportunity Granted (or Denied)
A trial judge does not violate self-represented efendant's Sixth
Amendment right o counsel by permitting standby counsel (only)
to participate in bench conferences requested by either defendant
or the prosecution. 125
Evidence or Testimony
A judge in a bench trial with a plaintiff SRL may request that
certain individuals be the first witnesses, and may direct the
defendants to proceed first in examining these witnesses. The court
may ask all the witnesses a significant number of questions, at
times dominating parts of the examination, and may permit the
parties to make a liberal supplementation of the record upon
conclusion of trial. 126
The trial judge may question a witness if he deems it necessary to
clarify a matter, or to develop more fully the facts for the benefit
of the jury. 127
District court may order the SRL to submit to the court and
opposing counsel the questions he intends to ask witnesses on
direct examination, where court received objections from the
defendants so that it could rule upon them in advance of trial, and
such a procedure is not a denial of due process. 128
115 Hicks v. Duncan, 173 F.3d 860, *1 (9th Cir. 1999).
116 Cranberg v. Consumers Union of U.S., 756 F.2d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The judge's
participation and evidentiary rulings tended to assist Cranberg, a pro se litigant who represented
himself well, though he lacked familiarity with procedural rules .... When a pro se litigant, even
one as skillful as Cranberg, goes to trial against a party represented by a member of the bar, the
responsibility of the trial judge may warrant participation which differs markedly from what would
be appropriate to a trial between adversaries represented by counsel. The record of this trial reveals
ajudge conscious of his duty and conscientious in its discharge. Rather than prejudicing Cranberg's
position, we see the judge's efforts as attempts to enlighten it. We are satisfied that he measures
taken below to develop and control the proof were reasonable and directed towards reaching a just
decision." Id. at 392.)
117 United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975). The court, however, also held: "For
the trial judge to assume the responsibility of examining witnesses for either party would change
the judicial role from one of impartiality to one of advocacy. The fact that a defendant represents
himself does not alter the judicial role nor does it impose any new obligation on the trial judge. The
defendant under those circumstances must assume the responsibility for his inability to elicit
testimony." Id. at * 12.
128 Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 799 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1986) ("In devising this
unusual procedure, the court made it clear that it was doing so in order to help the trial proceed
more efficiently, to assist the pro se plaintiff in presenting his case to the jury, and to avoid
unnecessary expense, confusion and embarrassment for him during the trial. In a post-trial
conference, the district court articulated, for purposes of making a record for this anticipated appeal,
the difficulties that trial courts face in trying civil cases before a jury when the plaintiff is not
represented by counsel. The district judge described the problems that arise when a pro se plaintiff
attempts to question himself, including the incessant objections from opposing counsel. The district
court concluded that 'these [section 1983 pro se trials] are the most difficult cases we have in the
district court'.").
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The district judge may raise objections on self-represented
defendant's behalf and give him certain legal advice. 129
The trial judge may assist SRL by correcting some of her
misunderstandings of law and instructing her on what kind of
proof she needs offer. 130
A trial court may ask questions for such purposes as clarifying
ambiguities, correcting misstatements, or obtaining information
needed to make rulings.131
The trial judge may actively participate and give his own
impressions of the evidence or question witnesses, as an aid to the
jury, so long as he does not step across the line and become an
advocate for one side. 132
PART IV JUDICIAL ETHICS
In addition to the modern trend of federal case law permitting some
procedural assistance and information to SRLs, principles of modern
judicial ethics also apply directly to this issue. The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (MCJC) requires that judges "uphold and apply the law,
and ... perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." 133
The 2007 amendments to the MCJC added the following comment: "It is
not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their
matters fairly heard."134 An explanation regarding the newly added
comment states:
Throughout the life of the Commission, some witnesses urged the
Commission to create special rules enabling judges to assist pro se
litigants, while others urged the Commission to disregard calls for such
rules. This Comment makes clear that judges do not compromise their
impartiality when they make reasonable accommodations to pro se
litigants who may be completely unfamiliar with the legal system and the
"' United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) ("A pro se
defendant is subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence as defendants who are represented
by counsel.... The district judge was extremely solicitous in handling Merrill's trial, and appointed
advisory counsel to assist Merrill in the conduct of his pro se defense. On repeated occasions, the
judge raised objections to evidence offered by the prosecution. Similarly, more than once during
the trial, the judge excluded government counsel from the courtroom and provided Merrill with
sound legal advice. The district judge made every reasonable effort to protect Merrill's right to a
fair trial as well as his right to represent himself.").
130 Scott v. Rosenthal, 53 Fed. Appx. 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2002).
'3i United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1996).
1 Id. at 385.
133 Model Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.2 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2007).
134 Id. at Comment 4.
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litigation process. To the contrary, by leveling the playing field, such
judges ensure that pro se litigants receive the fair hearing to which they
are entitled. On the other hand, judges should resist unreasonable
demands for assistance that might give an unrepresented party an unfair
advantage. 135
The Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State
Court Administrators in 2012 passed a resolution stating that "[a] judge
may make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to
facilitate the ability of all litigants, including self-represented litigants, to
be fairly heard."136 States were encouraged to modify the comments to
their version of Rule 2.2 "to reflect local rules and practices regarding
specific actions judges can take to exercise their discretion in cases
involving self-represented litigants."
State judicial ethics codes are following the ABA's lead. An
Illinois judicial ethics provision states: "A judge shall accord to every
person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer,
the right to be heard according to law. A judge may make reasonable
efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of
self-represented litigants to be fairly heard." 137 Thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia have modified their judicial ethics rules by adding
the same or similar provision as in the MCJC.138 One of the more
interesting variations of the ABA code comment is that adopted by
Wisconsin:
A judge may exercise discretion consistent with the law and court
rules to help ensure that all litigants are fairly heard. A judge's
responsibility to promote access to justice, combined with the growth in
litigation involving self-represented litigants, may warrant more frequent
exercise of such discretion using techniques that enhance the process of
reaching a fair determination in the case. Although the appropriate scope
of such discretion and how it is exercised will vary with the circumstances
of each case, a judge's exercise of such discretion will not generally raise
a reasonable question about the judge's impartiality. Reasonable steps
that a judge may take in the exercise of such discretion include, but are
not limited to, the following: 1. Construe pleadings to facilitate
consideration of the issues raised. 2. Provide information or explanation
135 Reporter's Explanation of Changes, Model Code of Judicial Conduct Reporter's Explanation
of Changes r. 2.2 (Am.Bar Ass'n (2007) (emphasis added).
136 Resol. 2 In Support of Expanding Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct to
Reference Cases Involving Self-Reprenting Litigants (Am. Bar Ass'n 2012)..
137 RULES GOVERNING THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND JUDICIARY IN ILLINOIS, S. Ct. R.
63(A)(4).
138 Self-represented litigants and the code of judicial conduct, Nat'l Ctr. for St. Cts, (Nov.25,
2014), https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/2014/11/25/pro-se-litigants-in-the-code-of-judicial-
conduct.
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about the proceedings. 3. Explain legal concepts in everyday language. 4.
Ask neutral questions to elicit or clarify information. 5. Modify the
traditional order of taking evidence. 6. Permit narrative testimony. 7.
Allow litigants to adopt their pleadings as their sworn testimony. 8. Refer
litigants to any resources available to assist in the preparation of the case
or enforcement and compliance with any order. 9. Inform litigants what
will be happening next in the case and what is expected of them. 139
Notably, the U.S. Judicial Conference adopted a new ethics code
after the 2007 additions to the ABA's code but did not adopt their
reference to permitting reasonable accommodations to SRLs. 140
Thus, the evolution of judicial ethics vis a vis treatment of SRLs
follows that of the aforementioned federal decisional law. Both of these
developments contradict the Supreme Court's pronouncement hat SRLs
are not entitled to personal instruction about courtroom procedures. Yet,
as the Supreme Court continues to lag behind these developments,141
Most state high courts have also departed from the hard line, no-
assistance approach. 142
The incremental expansion of judicial assistance to SRLs should
be greatly expanded, as has long been the case in Canada. There, courts
have a judicial "duty of reasonable assistance" to SRLs. 143 Canadian case
139 Id. at 7.
140 Id. at 1.
141 It should be noted that some commentators, including Prof Rabeea Assy, oppose judicial
assistance.
142 Rodriguez v. Alaska State Comm. for Human Rights, 354 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2015)
(courts are required to provide some procedural guidance for a pro se litigant when it is clear what
action he or she is obviously trying to accomplish); Goldstein v. Fischer, 510 A.2d 184 (Conn.
1986) (Where a layman appears pro se, the court follows a liberal policy and carefully considers
the party's claims as far as they are fairly presented upon the record to ensure that no injustice has
been done under the law); State v. Gilbert, 326 P.3d 1060, 1063 (Kan. 2014) (Pro se pleadings are
liberally construed, giving effect to the pleading's content rather than the labels and forms used to
articulate the defendant's arguments); Hall v. Hall, 354 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Mont. 2015) (self-
represented litigants should be granted some degree of latitude); Rubin v. Rubin, 457 A.2d 12 (N.
J. 1982) (The self-represented litigant is deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard due to a
lack of understanding of motion practice, and because it is "fundamental that the court system...
protect the procedural rights of all litigants and to accord procedural due process to all litigants);
State v. Sprunger, 458 S.W.3d 482, 491-92 (Tenn. 2015) ((courts should take into account that
many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system); Bd. of
Zoning Appeals v. Tkacz, 764 S.E.2d 532, 536 (W. Va. 2014) (pro se litigants generally should not
be held accountable for all of the procedural nuances of the law; it is the duty of the trial court to
insure fairness, allowing reasonable accommodations for the pro se litigant so long as no harm is
done an adverse party; the trial court must strive to insure that no person's cause or defense is
defeated solely by reason of their unfamiliarity with procedural or evidentiary rules; the court
should strive to ensure that the diligent pro se party does not forfeit any substantial rights by
inadvertent omission or mistake; cases should be decided on the merits, and to that end, justice is
served by reasonably accommodating all parties, whether represented by counsel or not).
(emphasis added).
143 Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the
Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 601 (2008-09).
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law articulating this duty, based on a judge's duty to ensure a fair trial,
should be given serious consideration, because those d cisions "come
from a Commonwealth country with historical and legal roots similar to
the U.S., which respects the rule of law, and which shares the same
bedrock values of fairness, adversarial justice, and impartiality."
' 144
Despite the existence of this duty and the greater forms of judicial
assistance courts are required or permitted to provide SRLs, Canadian
courts, too, continue to struggle to define the boundaries of "reasonable
assistance." 1 4 5
CONCLUSION
This summary of the law on judicial assistance to SRLs indicates
that federal courts have gradually shifted their view of the necessity for
accommodating SRLs' lack of legal knowledge and skill. Departing from
Supreme Court jurisprudence holding no, or minimal, instruction is to be
provided SRLs, a growing number of court are accepting the reality that
there is a need for accommodations, relaxation of ordinary strict
enforcement of rules, and even affirmative assistance to prevent a
forfeiture of rights or a miscarriage of justice. Assistance and self-help
programs outside the courtroom extant in most states 146 are now found in
growing numbers in federal courts. 147 The trend requiring or permitting
some forms of assistance inside the courtroom reflected by the foregoing
authorities is a welcome change that will enhance federal SRLs' access
to justice.
The next challenge is to persuade the Supreme Court that, while
the Constitution may not require judges to give SRLs "personal
instruction," all courts as a matter of due process, and the duty to ensure
a fair trial have an added duty to provide them with reasonable judicial
assistance to avoid what the Court itself has recognized as an unfair
"asymmetry-of- representation." Equal justice demands no less. As the
quoted language at the outset of this piece states, "we can ill afford to
confront them with a government dominated by forms and mysterious
rituals and then tell them they lose because they did not know how to play
the game or should not have taken us at our word."
144 Id. at 606.
145 Id. at 616.
146 Self-Representation Resource Guide, Nat'l Ctr. for St. Cts., (Sept. 17, 2018),
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Self-Representation/Resource-Guide.aspx.
147 Jefri Wood, PRO SE CASE MANAGEMENT FOR NONPRISONER CIVIL LITIGATION, Fed. Jud.
Ctr., 1st ed. (2016).
